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Agency Law and the New Economy
By Mark J. Loewenstein*
This article considers the status of workers in the "new economy," defined as the sharing
economy (e.g., Uber, Lyft) and the on-demand economy. The latter refers to the extensive
and growing use of staffing companies by established businesses in many diffcrent indus-
tries to provide all or a portion of their workforce. Workers in both the sharing economy
and the on-demand economy are, generally speaking, at a disadvantage in comparison to
traditional employees. Uber drivers, for example, are typically considered independent
contractors, not employees, and therefore are not covered underfederal and state laws
that protect or provide benefits to employees. Similarly, employees of a staffing company
may consider themselves employees of the client company and, therefore, entitled to nego-
tiate collectively with the client company and receive the same benefits as the client com-
pany's employees, yet the client company may take the position that it is not the employer
or even a 'joint employer" of such workers. Courts considering the claims of these workers
typically look to the common-law definition of "employee," as legislatures have typically
neglected to define "employee" when drafting laws to protect employees. The resulting lit-
igation has generated judicial decisions that are difficult to parse and often treat workers
unfairly. This article takes afresh approach to this problem, considering the shortcomings
of the common-law definition and suggesting solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition among businesses ideally results in lower prices and/or superior
products or services for consumers. To achieve these goals, businesses generally
reduce costs, employ technology, or increase the productivity of their work-
forces. In any case, businesses operate in a legal environment, one that generally
increases the cost of doing business but also offers the opportunity to gain a
competitive advantage if a business can avoid or reduce the cost of those legal
rules. The stunning growth of Uber, Lyft, and numerous other businesses that
have contributed to what is often called the "sharing economy"' illustrates mul-
* Monfort Professor of Commercial Law, University of Colorado Law School. The author wishes to
thank his colleague, Scott Moss, and the reviewers of this article, Jeffrey Rubin and Vicki Tucker, for
their insightful and helpful comments.
1. The sharing economy has been described as " ta]n economic model based on sharing underuti-
lized assets .. for monetary or non-monetary benefits." Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a
Shared Definition, FAST Co. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-
sharingeconomy-lacks-a-shared-definition. This simple definition describes Uber and other ride-
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tiple strategies for achieving a competitive advantage .2 Uber, for instance, uses a
sophisticated mobile app to connect drivers to fare-paying customers (or riders).
The company leverages this technology by structuring its legal relationship with
the drivers so that they are independent contractors and not employees, thus
avoiding employment-related costs and regulations and providing a competitive
advantage over traditional taxi services, whose drivers are classified as employ-
ees. 3 In a sense, Uber's use of regulatory arbitrage has reduced or eliminated
at least some of the costs it would otherwise have incurred (e.g., workers' com-
pensation, unemployment compensation, a d social security contributions) and
shifted those costs to the drivers.' It should come as no surprise that Uber's ad-
vantages have caused a reaction from traditional taxi companies, which seek to
sharing services: The "underutilized assets" are the cars owned by the drivers, who employ those cars
in exchange for a fare. Uber has captured a good deal of media attention because of its success: Over
400,000 individuals currently serve as Uber drivers, see O'Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 201 F. Supp.
3d 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Uber drivers are available in 614 cities, see UBER, http://www.uber.
corn (last visited June 19, 2017). Uber has faced challenges to its business model in numerous juris-
dictions, both in the United States and abroad, see, e.g., O'Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 n.6; and
Uber itself has been valued at over $50 billion, see Chris Higson, The Value oj Uber FoB (Oct. 9,
2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.forbes.cornsites/bsbusinessstrategyreview/2015/10/09/the-value-of-
uber/#7bl658ac7dda (discussing Uber's market valuation); Tracey Lien, A Thorn in Uber's Side,
L.A. TMs, Jan. 24, 2016, at C1 (same). Although Uber may be the face of the sharing economy,
many other new businesses operate on a similar model. Airbnb, for instance, allows property owners
to "share" parts or all of their property with paying guests. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989
N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (Sup. Ct. 2014). The Airbnb model has been challenged by the lodging industry
because the property owners who list their property on the Airbnb website may be able to avoid the
taxes and regulatory requirements that apply to traditional hotels and motels. See id. at 790-91. The
Airbnb model does not raise the issue as to whether the property owners are employees of the com-
pany, but it does raise other agency law issues. For instance, are property owners who list their prop-
erty on Airbnb agents of Airbnb for certain purposes? This article is less concerned with such issues
than the employee/independent contractor issue raised by the business models of companies such as
Uber.
2. Aside from what might be called the sharing economy, the labor force has been changing in
recent years. A recent study of "alternative work arrangements "-defined as temporary help agency
workers, on-call workers, contract workers, and independent contractors-found that the percent of
workers in this category rose from 10.1 percent of the labor force in 2005 to 15.8 percent in 2015.
Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature oj Alternative Work Arrangements in the
United States, 1995-2015 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22667, Sept.
2016), http://www.nber.org/w22667.pdf. One scholarly report recently estimated that, by the year
2020, over 40 percent of workers will fall into that category. INTLIT, INTuT 2020 REPORT: TWENT
TRNDS THAT WILL SHAPE THE NEXT DECADE 21 (2010) (projecting various changes in labor markets).
These alternative work arrangements have been accelerated by the use of online platforms-such
as Uber-that allow service providers to locate customers, and vice versa, thus creating a triangular
relationship among workers, customers, and i termediaries. In addition to being referred to as the
sharing economy, this triangular relationship is sometimes called the gig economy, the on-demand
economy, or the 1099 economy (referring to the fact that independent contractors receive an IRS
Form 1099 from the person that pays them for services).
3. Of course, structuring the employment relationship so that the worker will fall within the def-
inition of an independent contractor is hardly a new phenomenon, and companies often go to great
lengths to achieve that result, as this article seeks to demonstrate. See Craig v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 72-73 (Kan. 2014) ("As FedEx's counsel acknowledged at oral argument, the
company carefully structured its drivers' operating agreements so that it could label the drivers as
independent contractors in order to gain a competitive advantage, i.e., to avoid the additional
costs associated with employees. In other words, this is a close case by design, not happenstance.").
4. Uber's success is attributable to more than its regulatory arbitrage; Uber has reduced the trans-
action costs of the ride service industry. See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CH. L. Rv.
Agency Law and the New Economy 1011
have Uber subjected to the same legal requirements (e.g., licensing and other
regulatory requirements) that they face.' Additionally, Uber's drivers have chal-
lenged their classification as independent contractors, arguing that they are em-
ployees and thus entitled to the federal, state, and local protections that employ-
ees enjoy.6 For the most part, the resolution of the status of Uber drivers (and
workers in similar situations7 ) turns on common-law doctrines of agency law de-
veloped many years ago.
A second hallmark of the new economy, and one that parallels the sharing
economy, is businesses' use of staffing companies to provide all or a portion
of the labor that the business may need at a given facility, particularly temporary
employees. This frees the client business from maintaining a large, permanent
workforce and, instead, allows it to call on staffing companies as the need arises.
As a result, temporary employment is one of the fastest-growing segments of the
new economy.' The arrangement, which may be characterized as the "on-
demand economy" and is called "contingent employment" by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics,9 typically provides that, contractually, the staffing company
is the "employer" of those workers for all purposes, including hiring, firing, dis-
cipline, and supervision, thereby relieving the client company of the normal re-
sponsibilities and liabilities of an employer. Staffing companies compete with
one another to provide their clients with the lowest labor costs, thus driving
down the wages of the staffing company's employees. As in the Uber example,
Dialogue 85, 87-89 (2015) (discussing the ways in which Uber reduced transaction costs compared
to the traditional taxi industry).
5. E.g., Greenwich Taxi, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. Conn. 2015) (grant-
ing Uber's motion to dismiss claims based on Lanham Act, state unfair practices act, and other laws);
Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 4:14-0941, 2015 WL 1034254 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
10, 2015) (denying Uber's motion to dismiss various state law claims); Manzo v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. 13-C-2407, 2014 WL 3495401 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) (denying Uber's motion to dismiss var-
ious state law claims); Yellow Grp. LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 12-C-7967, 2014 WL 3396055
(E.D. Ill. July 10, 2014) (granting Uber's motion to dismiss on various state law claims); Boston
Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 1338148 (D. Mass. Mar.
27, 2014) (denying Uber's motion to dismiss claims of unfair competition under Massachusetts
law). A recent news story reported that Uber faced more than seventy federal law suits, many of
them challenging its failure to comply with regulatory requirements relating to traditional transpor-
tation companies. Marisa Kendall, Uber Battling More than 70 Federal Lawsuits, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July
17, 2016, at D3, 2016 WLNR 21946192.
6. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint &Jury Demand, O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. CV-13-3826-EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014), 2014 WL 10805308.
7. There are many similar triangular arrangements. See Casey Leins, Who's a Sharing Economy
Worker?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. (Aug. 21, 2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.usnews.con/news/blogs/
data-mine/2015/08/21/uber-airbnb-etsy-who-are-the-sharing-economy-workers. Other well-known
firms include Etsy (handmade goods), TaskRabbit (chore platform), GrubHub (food delivery), and
Washio (laundry). See id.
8. See In re Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015), 2015 WL
5047768, at *11, "15; CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS ET. AL., WHO'S THE Boss RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
LaOR STANDARS IN OUTSOURCED WORK 21 (2014) (describing the growth of contingent employment);
Marc Lifsher, A Fight over 'Perma-Ternp' Work, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2014, at B2 (discussing the growth
of the staffing industry).
9. See injra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
10. See DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENORCEMENT 20-21
(2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf (reporting to the Wage and
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this arrangement may create a competitive advantage to the extent that the client
company's competitors are burdened with higher labor costs. Such arrangements
have been and increasingly are being challenged.
A typical example of contingent employment was at the center of a labor law
dispute involving Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. ("BFI"), which
used a staffing company to furnish about 240 full-time, part-time, and on-call
sorters, screener cleaners, and housekeepers to work at a recycling facility oper-
ated by the company." BFI also directly employed about sixty workers at the
same facility. A union petitioned to represent the staffing company employees
and took the position that the staffing company and BFI were joint employers
of those workers and obligated to negotiate with the union. BFI argued that it
was not their employer, a position that the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") ultimately rejected, as more fully discussed below. 12
The new economy is thus one that, among other things, has altered the rela-
tionship of many workers to their work. In Uber's view, Uber drivers do not
work for Uber, even though their passengers may view them as equivalent to in-
dividuals who drive for, and are employees of, a taxi company 13 Employees of
the staffing company who worked at BFI's facility appeared, for all intents and
purposes, to be BFI's employees and, indeed, may have so considered them-
selves. Although independent contractors and staffing agencies have long been
a part of the business landscape, their use has dramatically increased in recent
years, initially as a result of the Great Recession. 14
At the heart of both of these arrangements is the legal question of what it means
to be an employee, a question often resolved by reference to a common-law def-
inition of the term. This definition was developed by courts for the purpose of
determining whether the employee's purported employer would be vicariously
liable for the employee's tortious conduct. 15 Bearing in mind that the relationship
Hour Division of the Department of Labor); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to
Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rv. 1673, 1690-91 (2016).
11. Browning- Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *3.
12. See injra Part III.B.
13. See Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 226 (D.D.C. 2015).
14. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out oj Employment Law? Accountability jor Wage and
Hour Violations in an Age ojEnterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTs. & EMP. PoL'YJ. 201, 202-04 (2011)
(discussing disaggregation).
15. Under the terminology of the Restatement (Second) ojAgency, the employer would be vicariously
liable for the torts of its " ervants." See REStaTEMENt (SECOND) O AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAw INST. 1958). The
Restatement makes this clear in its definitions of "master," "servant," and "independent contractor
The word "servant" is thus used to distinguish a group of persons for whose physical conduct
the master is responsible to third persons. It is convenient to distinguish this group of persons
from other persons for whose physical conduct the employer is not responsible. These latter per-
sons fall into two groups: those who are agents but do not respond to the tests for servants, and
those who are not agents. For the purpose of determining whether or not the employer is re-
sponsible for their physical conduct, however, it is immaterial whether such persons are agents
or are not agents. For this reason the term "independent contractor" is used to indicate all per-
sons for whose conduct, aside from their use of words, the employer is not responsible except in
the performance of nondelegable duties.
Id. § 2 cmt. b.
Agency Law and the New Economy 1013
between businesses and their workers is traditionally the subject of a number of
different federal and state laws protecting those workers, it is problematic, to
say the least, to make those protections-such as minimum wage, retirement ben-
efits, and the right to unionize-subject to a common-law definition of "employee"
developed for an entirely different purpose16 Many workers in the new economy
who are classified as independent contractors are as deserving of the same protec-
tion as their fellow workers laboring in the traditional economy who are classified
as employees,'7 indeed, fundamental concepts of justice require that similarly sit-
uated persons be treated equally under the law."
This article thus considers how the law could be reshaped to accommodate
the needs of those workers, considering first employees in the sharing economy
and then employees in the on-demand economy. This article concludes with two
suggestions. First, to the extent that the determination of whether a worker is an
employee turns on common-law doctrines, courts should reconsider those doc-
trines, recognizing the limited purpose for which they were developed. A simpler
way to think about the common-law classification problem would draw on prec-
edents under the federal securities laws that use a "family resemblance" test to
determine whether a promissory note is a security.19 Similarly, to determine
whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor, courts might rec-
ognize a paradigmatic independent contractor and determine whether the
worker in question bears a strong resemblance to an independent contractor
(based on characteristics that typically define an independent contractor) or
bears a stronger resemblance to a paradigmatic employee (again, based on the
characteristics that typically define an employee). Second, legislatures enacting
employment-related laws or agencies promulgating rules need to grapple with
the difficult question of coverage: that is, for purposes of the legislation in ques-
tion, who should be considered an employee? This article discusses some tenta-
tive ideas about how a law or rule might define what constitutes an employee for
purposes of such law or rule.
16. The need to extend statutory protections to independent contractors has been recognized in
federal law. For example, although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not protect non-
employees, racial discrimination against independent contractors is unlawful. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2012); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Alexander v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303 (11th
Cir. 2000) (holding that statistical evidence may be used to establish discrimination).
17. In this context, it makes little sense to shape the definition of employee to take advantage of
the economic efficiencies that companies like Uber offer. C]. Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Ger-
adin, Ejficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19
STAN. TECH. L. Rv. 293 (2016) (arguing that economic efficiencies should influence the way we think
about classification issues).
18. For example, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.5. 432, 439 (1985).
19. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.5. 56, 64-65 (1990).
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II. THE COMMON LAW OF AGENCY
A. THE ELEMENTS OF AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Although modified in some statutes that define an employment relationship, as
explored below, the core of the definition of employee can be traced back to the
common law. The early common-law courts and the first two Restatements of
Agency used the term "master" to describe what modern courts call an "employer,"
and they used "servant" to describe what modern courts and the Restatement
(Third) of Agency call an "employee."20 The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines
an employee as "an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control
the manner and means of the agent's performance of work. "21 It is worth noting,
however, that this definition is both underinclusive and overinclusive.
The definition is underinclusive because it excludes persons who are normally
thought of as employees and are treated as such by their employers. For exam-
ple, a physician employed by a hospital might not be deemed an employee, as
defined by the Restatement, because the hospital/employer (not itself being a doc-
tor) lacks the authority or wherewithal to control the way the physician practiced
medicine.22
The definition is overinclusive because it captures agents who act gratuitously
and are not considered employees, as that term is commonly understood.23 For
example, if a person (the agent) volunteers to help a friend (the principal) in a
task-say, washing a car-and the helper accepts direction from the principal,
the helper is deemed to be an "employee" under the Restatement (Third) of
Agency.24 This is so even though the helper is uncompensated, may have no pre-
vious or ongoing similar relationship with the principal, and in common par-
lance would never be called an employee.25
The definition of "servant" or "employee" often departs from common under-
standing because the drafters of the Restatement intended to describe a relation-
ship that should result in vicarious liability for the master/employer if the servant/
employee negligently injured another when acting within the scope of employ-
20. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 2 (AM. LAw INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) O; AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
21. RESTATEMENT (TIR) o; AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O AGENCY § 223 cmt. a (AM. LW INST. 1958) ("[T]he physician employed
by a hospital to conduct operations is not, in the normal case, a servant of the hospital .... "); see
Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1043-44 (Ohio 1990) (holding that hospital lacked suf-
ficient control over physician with staff privileges to justify liability under respondeat superior), over-
ruled in part by Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
23. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) O AGENCY § 7-07(3)(b) ("[T]he fact that work is performed gratu-
itously does not relieve a principal of liability.").
24. See id.; see also Heims v. Hanke, 93 N.W.2d 455 (Wis. 1958) (holding uncle vicariously liable
for negligence of nephew who was helping uncle wash his car).
25. RESTATEMENT (TIR) o AGENCY § 1.04(3) (AM. LAw INST. 2006) (defining "gratuitous agent"); see
also id. § 7.07 cmt. f ("The fact that an agent performs work gratuitously does not relieve a principal
of vicarious liability when the principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of
the agent's performance of work.").
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ment.26 As the hospital cannot control the way its employee/physician practices
medicine, the common law did not impose vicarious liability on the hospital .27
By contrast, in the example of the volunteer car washer, if that volunteer negli-
gently injured a third person while washing the car, the principal would bear
vicarious liability because, by assumption, the principal could control the con-
duct of the agent. One cannot overstate the importance of the underlying ratio-
nale for the common-law definition of "employee." It makes little sense to apply
federal employment laws to a wholly voluntary and gratuitous relationship (e.g.,
the volunteer car washer) and still less to deny the benefits of those laws to, for
example, our hypothetical hospital-employed physician.
In addition to the definition of "employee," the common law developed a con-
trasting definition, that is, an "employment" relationship that would not result in
vicarious liability for the employer. If the employer lacked the right to control the
worker, the worker would likely be characterized as an "independent contrac-
tor," and the employer would not be liable for the negligent conduct of that
worker. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an independent contractor
as "a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is
not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect
to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. "28 This definition
is thus the obverse of the definition of an employee- both definitions center on
the question of control. Courts have sought to identify the characteristics of a
worker whose employer typically lacked such control. Those characteristics
are succinctly captured in a comment in the Restatement (Third) of Agency:
[Tihe extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the principal
may exercise over details of the work, whether the agent is engaged in a distinct oc-
cupation or business, whether the type of work done by the agent is customarily
done under a principal's direction or without supervision, the skill required in
the agent's occupation, whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and
other instrumentalities required for the work and the place in which to perform
it, the length of time during which the agent is engaged by a principal, whether
the agent is paid by the job or by the time worked whether the agent's work is
part of the principal's regular business, whether the principal and the agent believe
that they are creating an employment relationship, and whether the principal is or is
26. Indeed, the Restatement (Third) oj Agency defines employee in the section that establishes an
employer's vicarious liability for a tort committed by an employee within the scope of employment.
Id. § 7.07. In at least one case, a court considered whether an Uber driver was an employee for pur-
poses of respondeat superior liability and determined that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint were
sufficient to withstand Uber's motion to dismiss. Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222
(D.D.C. 2015).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 7.07 cmt. b ("An employer's ability to exercise control over
its employees' work- related conduct enables the employer to take measures to reduce the incidence of
tortious conduct.").
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (AM. LAw INST. 1958). Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (abandoning the term independent contractor, but noting
that the term "independent contractor" is "equivocal in meaning and confusing in usage because some
termed independent contractors are agents while others are nonagent service providers").
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not in business. Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal has exercised
in practice over the details of the agent's work.29
Applying these factors, or variations thereof developed by various courts, has
been challenging for the courts and has yielded inconsistent results .
3
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMON-LAW DEFINITION:
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. DARDEN
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 31 a precedent from the U.S. Supreme
Court, illustrates the influence of the common-law definitions of employee and in-
dependent contractor in a case that does not involve vicarious liability but rather
the applicability of a federal statute protecting a worker's retirement benefits. Al-
leging a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") 32
an individual who sold insurance policies issued by the defendant, Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. ("Nationwide"), claimed that his contract entitled him to
certain retirement benefits after he ceased to be a Nationwide agent, even though
he violated a one-year noncompetition agreement. The plaintiff claimed that
ERISA precluded Nationwide from terminating his retirement benefits. 3 3 Nation-
wide, in turn, argued that ERISA only related to benefits promised employees,
and the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than Nationwide's em-
ployee. The Supreme Court held in favor of Nationwide in a case that saw
two trips to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The first opinion of the appellate court followed a district court decision in
favor of Nationwide. The appellate court vacated that decision, holding that
the district court's reliance on the common-law definition of "employee" was er-
roneous and that the district court should have used a definition that was con-
sistent with the "declared polic[ies] and purposes" of ERISA .3 On remand, the
district court developed such a definition and entered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, which was then affirmed on appeal 5 The issue before the Supreme
Court was simply whether the term "employee" in ERISA incorporated the
common-law definition or whether the statute should be interpreted in light
of the purposes for which it was enacted. The Supreme Court held that the
term "employee," as used in ERISA, meant common-law employee and thus re-
manded the case for a determination as to whether the plaintiff would qualify as
an employee "under traditional agency law principles."36
29. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) r AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f.
30. See Paul A. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 MICH. L. REv. 365, 372 (1930) ("[O]n
the same .. facts, with two courts applying the same test, one will say there is' and the other will say
there is not' such control, or right of control, as to produce the master-servant relation.").
31. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
33. Nationwide, 503 U.S. at 320 (referencing plaintiff's claim that the retirement benefits were
non-forfeitable because they already vested under the terms of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)).
34. Id. at 321 (quoting Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 1986)).
35. Id. at 322.
36. Id. at 328.
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that, in construing two other federal
statutes (the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and the Social Security Act
("SSA")), it had declined to use the common-law definition of "employee." 37 In
each case, the Court adopted a definition that it determined was more consistent
with the purpose of each statute in question, decisions that Congress subse-
quently rejected by amending the statute in question to make clear that "em-
ployee," as used in that statute, meant a common-law employee. In light of
this history, the Court in Nationwide took the safe road: Unless Congress pro-
vides a definition of "employee" in the federal statute using the term, "employee"
has its common-law meaning. In ERISA, Congress defines "employee" as "any
individual employed by an employer,"38 which the Court decided was
"completely circular and explain[ed] nothing," but it left the Court with no
choice other than to apply the common-law definition.
C. GAMING THE DEFINITION: THE FEDEX LITIGATION
As noted above, the common law of agency developed a multipronged test to
determine whether a person is an independent contractor and therefore not an
employee. The Nationwide Court cited that test with approval ,4 and as a result of
that and other cases, businesses often have crafted contracts to fit their workers
within the definition of independent contractor. No business has been more cre-
ative in that regard than FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. ('FedEx"), whose
efforts to craft an independent contractor relationship with its drivers spawned
litigation across the country .
4
1
FedEx has a straightforward business model: It picks up packages from its
customers and delivers them as instructed by those customers. At the heart of
this business model are its drivers, who drive readily identifiable FedEx trucks,
wear distinctive FedEx uniforms, and pick up packages from FedEx distribution
points for delivery to customers in the driver's designated territory. To execute
its business plan, FedEx requires thousands of drivers. Its business plan antici-
37. Id. at 324-27 (discussing NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (interpreting
NLRA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)), and United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (interpreting
the SSA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm (2012))).
38. Id. at 323 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 323-24 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O; AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958)).
41. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that drivers were
not employees for purposes of the NLRA); Gray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 799 F.3d 995,
997 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs, after finding genuine dispute
of material fact that plaintiffs were employees); Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 792 F.3d
818, 821 (7th Cir. 2015) (reviewing the independent contractor classification of FedEx delivery driv-
ers); Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1326 (11th Cir. 2015) (reversing
summary judgment for FedEx regarding employee status of drivers); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Pack-
age Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that drivers were employees under Or-
egon law); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 989-97 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of California law); FedEx Home Delivery v.
NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (vacating the NLRB's order after concluding that drivers
were independent contractors).
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pated that the drivers would not be FedEx employees- rather, each driver would
be an independent contractor responsible for pickups and deliveries in a desig-
nated territory and would enter into a formal written contract with FedEx. Find-
ing that the status of an independent contractor was inferior to that of an em-
ployee, FedEx drivers brought numerous actions across the United States,
challenging that designation.
The FedEx litigation resulted in a consolidation of numerous (though not all)
cases that FedEx drivers brought against the company. Interestingly, the cases
raised issues under numerous federal and state laws, yet in consolidating
many cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the
parties and the court relied on the common-law definition of independent con-
tractor. 42 More narrowly, in the multidistrict litigation, the district court chose
one case as its "lead" case, which was based on ERISA and the Kansas Wage Pay-
ment Act. 4 Relying on the traditional tests for classifying workers, the district
court held that the drivers were independent contractors .44 On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit referred the question of whether the driv-
ers were employees to the Kansas Supreme Court, 45 which ruled in favor of the
drivers. 46
For present purposes, the significance of these cases stems from the lengths to
which FedEx went to create an independent contractor relationship and the fact
that different courts reached different conclusions on the same facts. 47 The
FedEx/driver contract, which was termed an "Operating Agreement" (and one
example of which ran thirty-eight pages not including seven addendums) 48
was clearly drafted to bolster the case that the drivers were independent contrac-
tors. The contract included, as a preamble, a "background statement" that em-
42. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010), rev'd, 792 F.3d
818 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
43. See id. at 559 ("This opinion sets forth facts commonly applicable to all certified class actions
."); id. (interpreting the Kansas Wage Payment Act, KAN. STA. ANN. §§ 44-313 to -327).
44. Id. at 560.
45. Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (refer-
ring question of whether the drivers were independent contractors to the Kansas Supreme Court).
46. Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that
drivers were employees under the Kansas Wage Payment Act); see also In re FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 792 F.3d at 821 ("The Kansas Supreme Court's decision ecessitates the reversal of the
MDL court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FedEx and denial of the plaintiff drivers' sum-
mary judgment motion.").
47. Compare Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1024-25 (E.D.
Mo. 2013) (holding that drivers were employees), Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64
Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2007) (same), and Craig, 335 P.3d at 71 (same), with FedEx
Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504 (holding that drivers were independent contractors), FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (same), and Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,
281 P.3d 289, 292-93 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (concluding that jury instruction regarding employee
status was reversible error).
48. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., Pick-Up and Delivery Contractor Operating Agreement
(June 2002) thereinafter FedEx Operating Agreement], http:/leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/Archive/
UECI/Documents/112009/Fed%20Ex%20Contractor%200p%20Agreement.pdf. The form contract
is governed by Pennsylvania law. Id. § 19, at 37.
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phasized that the drivers were independent contractors and not employees. 
49
FedEx included several salient terms in the contract to establish an independent
contractor relationship:
* Drivers had to supply and maintain their own trucks. 
5
* Drivers were responsible for all operating costs and expenses. 51
* Tellingly, drivers were responsible
for exercising independent discretion and judgment to achieve the business ob-
jectives and results specified [in the contracti, and no officer, agent or employee
of FedEx Ground [hadi the authority to direct Contractor as to the manner or
means employed to achieve such objectives and results. For example, no officer,
agent or employee of FedEx Ground [hadi the authority to prescribe hours of
work, whether or when the Contractor [tooki breaks, what route the Contractor
[wasi to follow, or other details of performance.2
* Drivers were authorized to employ others but were responsible for all
costs and expenses related to such employees.
53
FedEx could not, however, simply contract with drivers to pick up and deliver
packages without exercising some control over how those functions were han-
dled by the drivers. Put simply, FedEx had to monitor the way in which the driv-
ers performed, or it would run the risk of tarnishing its brand and losing the
public's trust. It thus had to find a way to exercise the sort of control that an em-
ployer typically has over its employees, and, in that regard, the contract also ad-
dressed the following matters:
* The driver's truck had to bear the appropriate colors and logos "to iden-
tify the Equipment as a part of the FedEx Ground system." 
54
* Significantly, section 1.10 of the contract established specific perfor-
mance standards for drivers so that FedEx could achieve its "business ob-
jectives," which included a "standard of service that is fully competitive
with that offered by other national participants in the [package delivery]
industry." For instance, this section required drivers to "[f]oster the pro-
fessional image and good reputation of FedEx... with shippers and con-
signees, including adhering to vehicle identification and [driver] appear-
ance standards [specified in the contract."55
49. Id. at 1 ("Both FedEx Ground and Contractor intend that Contractor will provide these ser-
vices strictly as an independent contractor, and not as an employee of FedEx Ground for any
purpose.").
50. Id. §§ 1.1, 1.2, at 2-3.
51. Id. § 1.3, at 3.
52. Id. § 1.15, at 10-11.
53. Id. § 2.2, at 11-12.
54. Id. § 1.5, at 4.
55. Id. § 1.10, at 7-9.
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* Similarly, "each person having contact with the public under the provi-
sions of this Agreement [had to] wear a FedEx Ground-approved uni-
form, maintained in good condition, and .. otherwise keep his/her per-
sonal appearance consistent with reasonable standards of good order as
maintained by competitors and promulgated from time to time by
FedEx Ground. In addition, the Equipment [had to] be maintained in
a clean and presentable fashion free of body damage and extraneous
markings, in accordance with the standards of the industry."56
* Finally, "qualified FedEx Ground terminal personnel [could], at their op-
tion, visit customer locations with [the driver] four times annually to ver-
ify that [the driver was] meeting the standards of customer service pro-
vided in this Agreement.
57
These provisions, unusual in the typical principal/independent contractor re-
lationship, suggest that drivers were subject to the kind of control that employ-
ees experience. As a result of the adverse rulings by the Kansas Supreme Court
and other factors, in June 2016, FedEx settled this litigation, agreeing to pay
$240 million to 12,000 drivers.58 This extensive and costly litigation raises
the question as to whether there is not a better approach to this problem. The
Uber litigation raises the same problem in the context of a technology firm
and is discussed in the following section.
D. GAMING THE DEFINITION: THE UBER LITIGATION
Uber presents itself as a technology company that simply allows people seek-
ing a ride to find drivers willing to provide that ride (for a fee) or, in Uber's char-
acterization, it provides "peer-to-peer... passenger transportation services." 59 In
fact, Uber does more than it represents. For starters, Uber must recruit and
56. Id. § 1.12, at 9-10.
57. Id. § 1.14, at 10. The agreement also provided that: drivers were required to maintain their
equipment "in accordance with the safety and equipment standards specified in applicable federal,
state and municipal laws and any rules, regulations and orders of any applicable agency," id.
§ 1.2, at 2; FedEx was authorized to pay applicable licenses, taxes, and fees and deduct those pay-
ments (together with any expenses incurred by FedEx in making such payments) from amounts oth-
erwise due the drivers, id. § 1.3, at 3; and drivers were prohibited from using their equipment except
for the carriage of goods of FedEx, id. § 1.4, at 3-4. These provisions are unusual in a contract be-
tween a company and an independent contractor.
58. See Pepper Hamilton LLP, $240 Million Settlement Closes Chapter on FedEx IC Misclassification
Lawsuits, JD SteM (June 17, 2016) (describing settlement of consolidated litigation in the Seventh
Circuit); see also id. (describing $226 million settlement of California class action). FedEx has not
conceded the question in other cases. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (concluding that FedEx prevailed in an appeal from a decision of the NLRB that its drivers
were employees); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (same).
59. Grant E. Brown, Comment, An Uberdilemma: Employees and Independent Contractors in the Sharing
Economy, 75 MD. L. P v. ENDNOTES 15, 19 (2016) (quoting Rasier, LLC, Software License and Online
Services Agreement 1 (Nov. 10, 2014), https://uber-regulatory-documents.s3.amazonaws.conV
country/united states/p2p/Partner%20Agreement%20November%2010%202014.pdf). Rasier, LLC is
a subsidiary of Uber. Id. at 16 n.7. The Uber business model is succinctly described in O'Connor v.
Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). It is as follows:
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screen the drivers- not everyone is eligible to be an Uber driver. Prospective driv-
ers must apply, provide evidence of current licensure and insurance, pass a
background check and "city knowledge" test, own or rent a late-model vehicle,
and interview with an Uber employee.60 A person who successfully clears these
hurdles must sign a contract with Uber, which Uber titles the "Software License
and Online Services Agreement" (the "Uber/Driver Agreement") .61 As in the
FedEx Operating Agreement discussed above, the Uber/Driver Agreement in-
cludes terms intended to establish an independent contractor relationship.
The Uber/Driver Agreement's preamble includes this statement: "Uber does
not provide transportation services and is not a transportation carrier."62 Such
a statement was likely included with an eye toward litigation- it does not define
the obligation of either party to the contract. More narrowly, the Uber/Driver
Agreement includes terms that support an independent contractor relationship:
* A provision states that the "relationship between the Parties is solely that
of independent contracting parties," 63 and another provision, somewhat
duplicative, states that the agreement is "not an employment agreement
or employment relationship. "64
* A provision grants a license to drivers to use the Uber software. 65
* A provision imposed on drivers the sole responsibility for "any obliga-
tions or liabilities" that arise from providing services to passengers
through the Uber app. 66
The Uber/Driver Agreement is not executed until after Uber has approved a
person to be a driver, a process that parallels the hiring of a taxi driver by a tra-
ditional taxi company or, more generally, the hiring of any employee: applica-
tion, verification of licensing, background check, test, and interview. Moreover,
the Uber/Driver Agreement includes provisions that seem designed to protect
Uber's reputation and, of necessity, provide Uber with some measure of control:
In a nutshell, Uber provides a service whereby individuals in need of vehicular transportation can
log in to the Uber software application on their smartphone, request a ride, be paired via the Uber
application with an available driver, be picked up by the available driver, and ultimately be driven
to their final destination. Uber receives a credit card payment from the rider at the end of the ride,
a significant portion of which it then remits to the driver who transported the passenger.
Id. at 1135.
60. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136-38.
61. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement (July 2013), http://www.hostcarsla.
com/Software%20License%20and%200nline%20Services%20Agreement.pdf.
62. Id. at 1.
63. Id. § 7.1, at 7.
64. Id. § 7.2, at 7. To further bolster its position in litigation, the agreement is formally between
Uber and what is referred to as the "Transportation Company." Id. at 1. Presumably, the Transpor-
tation Company is itself an independent entity that employs drivers. In fact, the drivers are unlikely to
be entities and, in any event, only individuals who are approved by Uber, as described above, are
eligible to enter into the Uber/Driver Agreement.
65. Id. § 2.1, at 2. The license is non-exclusive and non-transferable. Id.
66. Id. § 3.1, at 3.
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* Passengers are encouraged to rate their drivers after each ride, and Uber
reserves the right to terminate the software license if a driver, on average,
falls below a certain rating. 67
* Drivers must "maintain high standards of professionalism and service, in-
cluding but not limited to professional attire. "s
* Uber reserves the right to terminate the agreement if the driver "no longer
qualifies, under applicable law or the quality standards of Uber, to provide
the [service] or operate the [driver's] Vehicle ."69
Outside of the Uber/Driver Agreement, Uber seeks to exercise some control
over its drivers. For instance, Uber ecommends, among other things, that driv-
ers play soft jazz or NPR on car radios, dress professionally, open the door for
clients, and provide an umbrella for clients. 7 Uber facilitates the ability of its
drivers to rent cars from three different vendors, including one that is a subsid-
iary of Uber. 71 A company hiring an independent contractor typically would not
be in the business of providing that independent contractor with essential tools,
but Uber recognizes that individuals who might be drivers might not have the
late-model cars required by Uber. In short, as with FedEx, the contract between
the company and the worker is designed to negate an employment relationship,
even though the realities of that relationship include at least some of the ear-
marks of an employment relationship.
On balance, the courts have not been receptive to Uber's argument that its
drivers are independent contractors. Each of two key cases was resolved by
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California: O'Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., 72 which involved alleged violations of various provisions of
the California Labor Code, and Yucesoy v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 3 which in-
volved alleged violations of Massachusetts law. The cases were eventually consol-
67. Id. § 4.3.3, at 5. Technically, Uber would "deactivate the Driver's access to the Software and
Service." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 9.1, at 9 (emphasis added); see O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133,
1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("Uber is deeply involved in marketing its transportation services, qualifying
and selecting drivers, regulating and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or terminating)
those who fail to meet standards, and setting prices.").
70. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149-50.
71. Uber promotes these arrangements on its website. Drive with Uber, UBER, goo.gl/mc6q9s (last
visited June 21, 2017) ("Need wheels? We've got you covered. Short and long-term vehicle options
are now available."). The vendors include Xchange Leasing, Enterprise, and Hertz. Id. The web page
states, for the Xchange Leasing option, that it provides a "[filexible lease program designed just for
drivers on the Uber platform." Id. Xchange Leasing is a subsidiary of Uber. See id.
72. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (evaluating the independent contractor status of Uber
drivers).
73. 109 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 2015). After plaintiffs filed a putative class action in
Massachusetts Superior Court, Uber removed the case to federal court in Massachusetts; the case was
transferred to the Northern District of California pursuant to a forum selection clause in the Uber/
Driver Agreement. Id. at 1261-62.
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idated for purposes of settlement 7 4 although the O'Connor case did generate an
important substantive decision by the district court.
In the course of ruling on Uber's motion for summary judgment in the O'Con-
nor case, the court discussed the applicable California law on the question of
whether drivers were independent contractors. That law is somewhat unique
in its approach to the employee/independent contractor question because it rec-
ognizes a presumption that a person is an employee if that person "performs ser-
vices" for the benefit of the employer. 7 The burden then shifts to the employer
to rebut that presumption, which requires the employer to address the extent to
which the employer controls the way the employees perform their duties and a
number of other factors identified by the California Supreme Court:
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or busi-
ness, (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without super-
vision, (c) the skill required in the particular occupation, (d) whether the principal
or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the per-
son doing the work, (e) the length of time for which the services are to be per-
formed, (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job, (g) whether
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal, and (h) whether or
not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee 76
These are, of course, similar to factors set forth in the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, as noted above. 7 7 However, the California courts have also stated that
"'the most significant consideration' is the putative employer's 'right to control
the work details."'7' The O'Connor court concluded that the plaintiff had estab-
lished, as a matter of law, that "Uber's drivers render services to Uber, and thus
are Uber's presumptive employees. 79 The court thus rejected Uber's argument
that it was merely a technology company that provided drivers with "leads"
that the driver could accept or reject. The court concluded that Uber simply
used technology in its business, as do other companies, and that Uber was, in
fact, in the transportation business and promoted itself as such. ° It follows
from this conclusion, the court said, that the drivers perform a service for
Uber because "Uber would not be a viable business without its drivers."' The
court also noted the various ways that Uber exercised control over its drivers
(e.g., Uber sets fares and prohibits drivers from answering passenger inquiries
74. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1116-17 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
75. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (citing Yellow Cab Coop., Inc. v. Worker's Comp. Appeals
Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Ct. App. 1991)).
76. Id. at 1139 (quoting S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404
(Cal. 1989)).
77. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
78. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at 404).
79. Id. at 1145.
80. Id. at 1141-42. The court noted: "Uber's own marketing bears this out, referring to Uber as
'Everyone's Private Driver,' and describing Uber as a 'transportation' system and the 'best transporta-
tion service in San Francisco.' Id. (quoting Uber's Official Blog).
81. Id. at 1142.
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about booking directly with a driver) but concluded that there remained ques-
tions of material fact regarding the determination of whether the control exer-
cised by Uber over its drivers was sufficient to establish that the drivers were em-
ployees. The determination was a mixed question of fact and law, requiring
further proceedings. 2 On the brink of the trial to resolve that question, the par-
ties in both cases reached a settlement agreement, requiring Uber to make some
changes to its contract with drivers and to make a payment of up to $100 mil-
lion. 3 The district court, however, refused to approve that settlement, ruling
that it needed additional information from the parties in order to determine
whether the settlement were "fair and adequate."84 As of this writing, the settle-
ment has not been finally approved.
E. TAX LAW
The employee/independent contractor issue is a significant one for purposes
of federal income taxes. Whether, for example, employers are required to with-
hold income taxes from their workers (and to pay social security taxes on their
behalf) turns on whether the workers are employees or independent contractors.
Cost savings, as noted above, incentivize employers to classify their workers as
independent contractors, a classification that is often challenged by the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"). The stakes are often high in such challenges, yet the rel-
evant code provision (section 3121(d) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"))
relies largely on the common law for the definition of employee: "any individual
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee."85 As in the Re-
statements and numerous court decisions, the IRS provided guidance on the def-
inition of a common-law employee by promulgating a twenty-factor test in a
1987 Revenue Ruling.86 Each factor, in some way, is designed to shed light
on whether the employer exercises control over the worker or, as the IRS stated
in its release, "twenty factors or elements have been identified as indicating
whether sufficient control is present to establish an employer-employee relation-
ship."87 Although this listing may be helpful in making a determination, the ul-
timate decision is still a difficult one. The IRS made clear in the Revenue Ruling
that the importance of any factor depends on the circumstances and that "for-
malistic aspects of an arrangement" must give way to the "substance of the ar-
rangement.'88 In other words, arrangements (such as those evident in the Uber
82. Id. at 1152.
83. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1113, 1116-17 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (re-
jecting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of settlement). Similar litigation involving Uber's
competitor, Lyft, was settled about the same time. See Tracey Lien, Judge OKs $27M Settlement oj Driv-
ers' Suit Against Lyjt, SAN DiEGO UNION-TRIB., June 25, 2016, at 3, 2016 WLNR 19464013.
84. O'Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1113.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (2012).
86. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 1987 WL 419174.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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and FedEx cases) will be scrutinized because they were designed to "achieve a par-
ticular status."89
Interestingly, IRC section 3121(d) does set out four kinds of workers who, by
definition, are deemed to be employees.9° These work categories could easily be
structured as independent contractor relationships, so it appears that for some
policy reason, Congress sought to preempt that possibility. For instance, a per-
son who works as a full-time life insurance salesman or a home worker who fin-
ishes goods furnished by another is deemed to be an employee. Although one
can imagine reasons why Congress may have identified these specific categories
for inclusion within the definition of "employee," the statute at least demon-
strates a way of defining "employee" other than relying on the common law or
a twenty-factor explication of the common law.
F. SUMMARY
It should be clear at this point that the definition of who is an employee and
who is an independent contractor is intensely factual and often unpredictable.
Various courts and administrative agencies making those determinations use dif-
ferent tests, with the result that a person may be an employee for some, but not
for other, purposes. Proposals for bringing some degree of consistency to this
area of the law are considered below. Before doing so, however, this article
turns to a second, related question dogging the new economy: Are joint employ-
ers present? As noted above, a second feature of the new economy is an in-
89. Id.
90. For pertinent purposes, the IRC defines the term "employee" to mean-
any individual (other than an individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who
performs services for remuneration for any person-
(A) as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable
products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or laundry or dry-
cleaning services, for his principal;
(B) as a full-time life insurance salesman;
(C) as a home worker performing work, according to specifications furnished by the person
for whom the services are performed, on materials or goods furnished by such person which
are required to be returned to such person or a person designated by him; or
(D) as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver, en-
gaged upon a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission to, his prin-
cipal (except for side-line sales activities on behalf of some other person) of orders from
wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar estab-
lishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations;
if the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of such services are to be performed
personally by such individual; except that an individual shall not be included in the term "em-
ployee" under the provisions of this paragraph if such individual has a substantial investment in
facilities used in connection with the performance of such services (other than in facilities for
transportation), or if the services are in the nature of a single transaction not part of a continuing
relationship with the person for whom the services are performed ....
26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(3) (2012).
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creased reliance on staffing companies to provide some or all of the workers that
a business needs. This arrangement, considered in the next section, raises issues
similar to that of the employee/independent contractor issue discussed above be-
cause the worker may argue that he or she meets the employee test with respect
to each putative employer.
III. THE JOINT EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
The joint employer doctrine was developed by the courts to describe situa-
tions in which more than one employer has some control over an employee
9 '
and, therefore, may be vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the em-
ployee9 2 or otherwise bear the responsibilities of an employer with respect to
that employee,93 notwithstanding the fact that the two employers were otherwise
unaffiliated with one another. 94 Until the last twenty years or so, the joint em-
ployer doctrine was not a frequently litigated issue. In early litigation, the
issue arose in the "borrowed servant" context-that is, where an employee of
one company (the "general employer") is loaned or leased to a second company
(the "special employer"). Typically, if the special employer exercises control over
the employee,9' the special employer becomes the "employer" for purposes of
vicarious liability 96 and various state and federal employment laws. 97 Tradition-
ally, the courts have been skeptical about imposing joint and several liability on
91. See generally Marc Linder, The Joint Employment Doctrine: ClarijyingJoint Legislative-Judicial Con-
fusion, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'y 321, 323-28 (1989) (discussing the control test's focus on end-
user firms and intermediaries).
92. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Ebert, 138 So. 4, 10 (Fla. 1931) ("tW]here a servant is jointly
employed by two masters the latter are jointly and severally liable for the servant's wrongful act to-
ward third parties committed while acting in behalf of all.").
93. E.g., 9 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR: LABOR RELATIONS § 4:27 (2017) (summarizing the joint em-
ployer doctrine: "Two separate entities are joint employers in relation to a given group of employees
and, therefore, subject to NLRB jurisdiction where they choose to codetermine or share matters gov-
erning essential terms and conditions of employment.").
94. "Joint employment" should be distinguished from two other situations in which an entity may
be saddled with the responsibilities and/or liabilities of an employer even though, nominally, that
entity does not directly employ the individuals in question. One such situation is when two or
more otherwise nominally independent entities are so interrelated that hey are considered a "single
employer" or "integrated enterprise." Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990,
992 (6th Cir. 1999). The other is where one entity acts as an agent of another. Id. In this article, I am
concerned only with situations in which a staffing company, otherwise unaffiliated with its client en-
tity, furnishes (via lease or other legal construct) workers to that client while contractually retaining
the rights and responsibilities of a legal employer.
95. Charles v. Barrett, 135 N.E. 199, 200 (N.Y. 1922) ("[A]s long as the employee is furthering the
business of his general employer by the service rendered to another, there will be no inference of a
new relation unless command has been surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere
fact of its division.").
96. Keitz v. Nat'l Paving & Contracting Co., 134 A.2d 296, ajj'd on rehg, 136 A.2d 229 (Md.
1957).
97. Rowe v. Grapevine Corp., 456 S.E.2d 1, 4 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that placement agency and
orchard that employed foreign nationals were joint employers for purposes of the West Virginia Wage
Payment and Collection Act).
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more than one employer, 98 noting the complexity and unfairness of doing so.
99
In any case, litigation regarding whether a controversy involved the doctrine was
not common until relatively recently. A search on Westlaw reveals that the term
"joint employer" appeared in only sixty opinions between 1892 and 1950, only
ten of which were issued by the federal courts. Starting in the 1960s, however,
federal agencies began to apply the doctrine in the context of the federal labor
statutes,100 and in the ensuing decades under various other federal employment
statutes. 101 The reliance of federal agencies on the doctrine has accelerated in re-
cent years: During 2000-2009, the doctrine was cited in 829 federal opinions
(and 165 state opinions), and between January 1, 2010, and May 1, 2017, the
doctrine has been cited in 1,983 federal opinions (and 182 state opinions). Per-
haps the most prominent recent decision came from the NLRB in 2015: In re
Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. ("Browning-Ferris"), 102 which, it has
been argued, has implications beyond the field of labor law. 103
B. THE BROWNING-FERRIs DECISION
In Browning-Ferris, the NLRB addressed, but did not define, "contingent em-
ployment" relationships. 104 The Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS"), however, de-
fines "continent workers" as "those individuals who do not perceive themselves
98. E.g., DePratt v. Segio, 306 NW.2d 62 (Wis. 1981) (refusing to adopt joint liability in bor-
rowed servant context).
99. Id. at 65. The plaintiff was an employee of the special employer and was injured by the neg-
ligence of a worker of the general employer, that is, a "borrowed servant," who was loaned to the
plaintiff's employer by another company. The court noted that, if liability were imposed on both em-
ployers, it would have to determine how much of the liability each should bear. Id. Also, in the con-
text of this suit, the plaintiff's employer would be protected by the workers' compensation statute, so
only the general employer would bear liability. Id. This, the court opined, would be unfair. Id.
100. E.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) (reversing lower court decisions that
overturned decision of NLRB that bus company and independent contractor providing cleaning
and maintenance employees for bus company were joint employers of those mployers under NLRA).
101. See Steven A. Carvell & David Sherwyn, It Is Time jor Something New: A 21st Century Joint-
Employer Doctrinejor 21st Century Franchising, 5 AM. U. Bus. L. Rrv. 5, 12-13 (2015) (footnotes omit-
ted) (noting that "there are three different administrative agencies whose use of the joint-employer
doctrine is relevant to employers on a day-to-day basis: the EEOC (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 .... Age Discrimination in Employment Act .... and Americans with Disabilities
Act ... ); the DOL (the Fair Labor Standards Act ... ); and the NLRB (the NLRA)"); id. at 13
("[E]ach agency employs a somewhat different test to determine joint-employer liability.").
102. In re Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015), 2015 WL 5047768.
103. Carvell & Sherwyn, supra note 101, at 6 (referring to the Browning-Ferris decision and ob-
serving that the "joint-employer doctrine is perhaps the hottest issue in labor and employment law
for 2015 and the foreseeable future"). The likelihood of finding a joint employer relationship in a
franchise increases if the test of Browning-Ferris were to apply. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Labor Re-
lations Bd., NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints Against McDonald's Franchi-
sees and Determines McDonald's, USA, LLC Is a Joint Employer (July 29, 2014). Franchisors typi-
cally exercise some degree of control over the franchisee's operations and, therefore, employees.
Similarly, licensors of trademarks exercise control over their licensees and run the risk of a finding
that they are the joint employers of their licensee's employees. See Rochelle Spandorf, Twelve Tipsfor
Licensors to Reduce Joint Employer Risks Under Today's Legal Standards-Revised, Bus. L. TODAY 1, 1-6
(Feb. 2016).
104. Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *2 (discussing the "recent dramatic growth in contin-
gent employment relationships").
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as having an explicit or implicit contract for ongoing employment. "' 05 The BLS
also acknowledged that the "term contingent work has been used, however, to refer
to a variety of work arrangements[, including] part-time work, self-employment,
employment in the business services industry, and, in fact, almost any work ar-
rangement that might be considered to differ from the commonly perceived
norm of a full-time wage and salary job. '16 It appears, based on the facts of Brow-
ning-Ferris, that the NLRB used the term in the broadest sense.
In Browning-Ferris, BFI contracted with Leadpoint Business Services ("Lead-
point") to supply workers for the BFI recycling facility in San Jose, California,
primarily to sort recycling materials moving on a conveyor belt. Under the
terms of the agreement, Leadpoint would "recruit, interview, test, select, and
hire personnel to perform work for BFI. '17 The agreement also provided that
Leadpoint was the sole employer of the personnel it supplied and that nothing
in the agreement should be construed as "creating an employment relation-
ship. "10 BFI agreed to compensate Leadpoint based on a rate schedule that re-
imbursed Leadpoint for each worker's wage, plus a specified percentage markup
that varied according to whether the work occurred during regular hours or
overtime.109 BFI employees also worked at the same facility, but they did differ-
ent work and were unionized.110 Leadpoint employees at the facility sought
union recognition from BFI under the theory that BFI was their joint employer
together with Leadpoint. The regional director of the NLRB determined that
Leadpoint was the sole employer of the employees in question, and the union
appealed that decision to the NLRB. In a controversial three-to-two decision,
the NLRB reversed and, in the course of its opinion, modified the rule that it
had applied for over thirty years.
Despite the contract language in the BFI/Leadpoint agreement, the realities of
BFI's operation necessitated a degree of control or supervision by BFI over the
workers supplied by Leadpoint. For instance, Leadpoint could not refer workers
who had previously been fired by BFI or who failed a drug test. More impor-
tantly, BFI could "reject" or "discontinue the use" of any personnel "for any rea-
son or no reason.""' BFI unilaterally set the shift schedules, determined whether
to run into overtime, dictated when the line would stop so employees could take
breaks, and signed the time sheets of the workers supplied by Leadpoint. 112 BFI
also provided safety training to those workers. 113
In considering these and other actions of BFI, the NLRB determined the ap-
propriate standard for determining whether BFI was a joint employer: Do the
105. BUtEAU ot LABOR STATiSTiCS, NEW DATA ON CONTINcENT AND ALTERNATiVE EMPLOYMENT (1995),
1995 WL 501664.
106. Id.
107. Browning- Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *4.
108. Id. at *3.
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id. at *3.
111. Id. at *5 (quoting the BFI/Leadpoint agreement).
112. Id. at *6.
113. Id. at *8.
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two employers "share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms
and conditions of employment"?"14 The NLRB articulated the following test to
determine whether the standard were satisfied:
In determining whether a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial in-
quiry is whether there is a common-law employment relationship with the employ-
ees in question. If this common-law employment relationship exists, the inquiry
then turns to whether the putative joint employer possesses sufficient control
over employees' essential terms and conditions of employment to permit meaningful
collective bargaining. 15
Citing the facts noted above (together with other facts not noted here), the
NLRB decided that BFI was a joint employer and, therefore, subject to the
NLRA with respect to the Leadpoint employees in question.16 In the course
of its opinion, the NLRB rejected precedents that required that (1) a joint em-
ployer not only possess the authority to control employees' terms and conditions
of employment but also exercise that authority, and (2) the putative joint em-
ployer's control be exercised directly (as opposed to indirectly, as through an in-
termediary)."' By dropping these additional requirements, the NLRB expanded
the number of firms falling under the definition of joint employer, and the im-
pact of this change is clear from the facts of Browning-Ferris.
In previous cases, the NLRB stated that "[t]o establish joint employer status
there must be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating
to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision,
and direction." 18 These matters were, by contract, allocated exclusively to Lead-
point, so for the NLRB to rule in favor of the employees, it had to find that BFI's
indirect influence over these matters was meaningful. The NLRB concluded that
BFI wielded meaningful indirect influence because it had influence over who
could work at its facility, the work processes and assignments, and the employ-
ees' wages. As to wages, the contract fixed the reimbursement amount, which, in
effect, placed a cap on what Leadpoint could pay its employees. In addition, the
contract provided that Leadpoint could not pay its employees more than BFI
paid its employees performing similar tasks.119 In theory, Leadpoint could pay
its employees less, but that would still mean that BFI had influence over the
wage scale.
From a policy perspective, the NLRB expressly indicated that its ruling was
intended to take into account the growing contingent employment sector. 120
114. Id. at *2 (quoting NLRBv. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir.
1982)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at *24-25.
117. Id. at *2.
118. In re Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 NL.R.B. No. 61 (1984), 1984 WL 36182, at *3,
overruled by Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *1-3.
119. Browning-Feris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *5.
120. Id. at *1-2 ("T]he Board, without explanation, has ... imposed additional requirements for
finding joint-employer status, which have no clear basis ... in the common law, or in the text or
policies of the Act.... T]hese additional requirements-which serve to significantly and unjustifi-
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The workers, the NLRB suggested, ought to have the protections of the federal
labor laws.
The Browning-Ferris decision redefining "joint employer" appears to align federal
labor laws with the interpretation of laws by other federal agencies that administer
employment-related laws. The definitions of employer under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the NLRA are similar, 121 yet prior to Browning-
Feris, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which admin-
isters Title VII, employed a more flexible approach to determining when an em-
ployer qualified as a joint employer. The EEOC filed an amicus brief in Browning-
Ferris, urging the NLRB to adopt the EEOC's approach, under which "staffing
firms [such as Leadpoint] and their clients [such as BFI] generally qualify as joint
employers. 122 The NLRB appears to have embraced that position with its decision
in Browning-Ferris. 123 Similarly, the Department of Labor ("DOL"), administering the
Fair Labor Standards Act ('FLSA") 124 adopted a flexible approach to its definition of
"employer" and thus to the definition of "employee," an approach that has resulted
in a liberalized definition of joint employer 125
ably narrow the circumstances where a joint-employment relationship can be found-leave the
Board's joint-employment jurisprudence increasingly out of step with changing economic circum-
stances, particularly the recent dramatic growth in contingent employment relationships. This dis-
connect potentially undermines the core protections of the Act for the employees impacted by
these economic changes.").
121. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person .... "), with 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) ("The term 'employer' includes any person acting
as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly .... )
122. Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 9, In re Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 NL.R.B.
No. 186 (2015) (No. 32-RC-109684), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/briefs/browning.html.
123. See In re Retro Envtl., Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (2016), 2016 WL 4376615 (applying
Browning-Ferris).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
125. See Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 204-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying
motion to dismiss because complaint stated a plausible claim that the franchisor defendants were the
joint employers of franchisee employees under the FLSA); see also Salinas v. Commercial Interiors,
Inc., 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017) (developing the concept of joint employment under the FLSA).
In Salinas, the court emphasized the importance of the relationship between the two employers (a con-
tractor and subcontractor). Id. at 145-49. According to the court, for purposes of the FLSA, joint em-
ployment exists when
(1) two or more persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise
codetermine-formally or informally, directly or indirectly-the essential terms and conditions
of a worker's employment and (2) the two entities' combined influence over the essential terms
and conditions of the worker's employment render the worker an employee as opposed to an
independent contractor.
Id. at 129-30. The appellate court opinion focused on whether the general contractor, which had
prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in the district court, was a joint employer with the sub-
contractor. Id. at 129. The appellate court ruled that the district court had applied the wrong test and
reversed the lower court judgment, holding that the general contractor was a joint employer. Id. In-
sofar as the relationship between the general contractor and the subcontractor's employees was con-
cerned, the appellate court discussed the xtensive control that the general contractor exercised over
the subcontractor's employees. Id. at 145-49.
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C. JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FLSA
Almost unique among federal employment law statutes, the FLSA includes a
definition of "employee," albeit one that is opaque. The FLSA defines "employee"
as "any individual employed by an employer" (not a helpful definition at all), but
the statute defines "employ" as including "to suffer or permit to work." '12u Com-
bining the two, an employee is a person who an employer suffers or permits to
work, a rather broad definition of employee. In Nationwide, the Supreme Court ob-
served that this definition is broader than the common law definition: "This ...
definition [of 'employ'] ... stretches the meaning of 'employee' to cover some par-
ties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency
law principles. '127 The Supreme Court, however, has considered only one case in
which the definition was at issue, and in that case, the Supreme Court affirmed an
appellate court decision that found an employment relationship,128 holding that
there was sufficient evidence to support the appellate court's decision.129 In that
context, the Supreme Court avoided a close examination of what the FLSA defini-
tion might mean. 130
Federal appellate courts, however, have considered the question, especially in
the context of joint employment. In Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. 131 for instance,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resolved an outsourcing case in
which garment manufacturers hired contractors to stitch and finish pieces of
clothing. The contractors, in turn, hired the plaintiffs to do such work for nu-
merous manufacturers. The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturers were
joint employers together with their contractors under the FLSA and, therefore,
liable for their minimum wage, overtime, and other claims under federal and
state law. The appellate court reversed a lower court decision, which, the appel-
late court held, applied too narrow a definition of employee in holding for the
defendant manufacturers. 132
The appellate court in Zheng, after reviewing previous Circuit and Supreme
Court decisions, set out a six-factor test to determine whether the garment work-
ers were employees of the manufacturers:
(1) whether [the manufacturers ] premises and equipment were used for the plain-
tiffs' work, (2) whether the Contractor Corporations had a business that could or did
126. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), (g) (2012).
127. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992); see generally James Reif, "To
Suffer or Permit to Work": Did Congress and State Legislatures Say What They Meant and Mean What They
Said?, 6 NE. U. LJ. 347, 362-71 (2014) (analyzing lower courts' interpretations).
128. Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1946), ajj'd, Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
129. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.
130. In another FLSA case, Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961), the Su-
preme Court reversed an appellate court decision that home workers who were members of a coop-
erative and did piecework in their homes were not employees of the cooperative. The Supreme
Court's opinion does not include analysis of the statutory language or why that language means
that the common law definition does not apply in FLSA cases.
131. 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003).
132. Id. at 63-64.
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shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to another, (3) the extent to which
plaintiffs performed a discrete line-job that was integral to [the manufacturers ] pro-
cess of production, (4) whether responsibility under the contracts could pass from
one subcontractor to another without material changes, (5) the degree to which the
[manufacturersl or their agents supervised plaintiffs' work, and (6) whether plain-
tiffs worked exclusively or predominantly for the [manufacturers. 
133
These factors, the court said, addressed the "economic realities" of the plain-
tiffs' employment, which is the essence of the FLSA mandate. 134 However, in this
context, "economic realities" appears to be another term for "functional control,"
because after the court laid out these factors, it immediately discussed whether
their application demonstrated that the manufacturers had such control over the
plaintiff workers. 135 The six-factor test of the Second Circuit bears a strong re-
semblance to the independent contractor test discussed above, 136 and it may not
expand the instances in which a worker would be deemed an employee under
the FLSA, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's suggestion i  Nationwide that
it would. 137
Had the Zheng court taken the statutory phrase "suffer or permit to work" lit-
erally, the analysis would have been simpler and the outcome predictable. At
least arguably, the defendant manufacturers permitted the employees of the con-
tractor to work for them. The manufacturers knew that the contractors had em-
ployees and that those employees finished the garments that he manufacturers
delivered to the contractors, which the contractors returned to the manufactur-
ers once completed. Moreover, the language of the FLSA was cribbed by Con-
gress from state child labor laws, which were purposely broad in their scope
to provide the widest possible protection for children, 138 so an interpretation
of the FLSA that held a manufacturer liable for the mistreatment of employees
by a contractor would not be inconsistent with the origins of the phrase "suffer
or permit to work. 139 The federal courts, however, have not given the FLSA that
broad a meaning, as Zheng makes clear. Rather, the courts, with varying tests and
133. Id. at 72.
134. Id. at 71 (emphasizing assessment of "the circumstances of the whole activity," Rutherford,
331 U.S. at 730, viewed in light of "economic reality," Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33).
135. Id. at 72 (noting the importance of "functional control .. even in the absences of... formal
control").
136. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. For instance, the first Zheng test focuses on "prem-
ises and equipment," Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72, while the Restatement test asks, "whether the agent or the
principal supplies the tools and other instrumentalities required for the work and the place in which
to perform it." RSTATEMENT (TIR) o AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (AM. Law INST. 2006). The other Zheng
criteria similarly have cognates in the Restatement factors.
137. See Reif, supra note 127, at 368 ("T]he functional control standard for determining employ-
ment under the FLSA, as articulated by the Second Circuit in Zheng, does not appear to be distinct in
a meaningful way from the common law standard: both treat control as the basic criterion.").
138. Id. at 380-86 (discussing how an application of the "suffer or permit" language, true to its
original meaning, would operate).
139. See, e.g., Vincent v. Pdggi & Sons, Inc., 285 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1972) (concluding that fact that
child was an independent contractor under common law test did not preclude a finding that he was
an employee under the "permitted or suffered to work" statutory language of New York law, N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 2(7) (Consol. 2003)).
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language, have focused on the control that the putative employer exercised or
had a right to exercise, the heart of the common-law test. Indeed, in Zheng,
the Second Circuit reversed the trial court because the four-factor test that the
trial court had used-from an earlier Second Circuit decision'°40 -was too nar-
row and overly focused on a putative employer's "formal right to control the
physical performance of another's work."141
D. DOL GUIDANCE
Although the NLRB has relied on litigation to develop guidance on what con-
stitutes joint employment, the DOL has provided guidance on that question in a
regulation issued under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protec-
tion Act ("MWPA"). 142 The DOL regulation provides that an "agricultural em-
ployer" may be the joint employer of a farm worker employed by an independent
contractor who contracts with the agricultural employer, if the worker is "eco-
nomically dependent" on the agricultural employer 143 Economic dependency, in
turn, may be determined by considering seven factors articulated by the DOL 144
The regulation, however, also stated that hese factors "are illustrative only and
are not intended to be exhaustive- other factors may be significant and, if so,
should be considered, depending upon the specific circumstances of the rela-
140. Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984).
141. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69.
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (2012).
143. See 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(A)-(G) (2016).
144. Id. The DOL identified the following factors:
(A) Whether the agricultural employer/association has the power, either alone or through
control of the farm labor contractor to direct, control, or supervise the worker(s) or the
work performed (such control may be either direct or indirect, taking into account the nature
of the work performed and a reasonable degree of contract performance oversight and coor-
dination with third parties);
(B) Whether the agricultural employer/association has the power, either alone or in addition
to another employer, directly or indirectly, to hire or fire, modify the employment conditions,
or determine the pay rates or the methods of wage payment for the worker(s);
(C) The degree of permanency and duration of the relationship of the parties, in the context of
the agricultural activity at issue;
(D) The extent to which the services rendered by the worker(s) are repetitive, rote tasks re-
quiring skills which are acquired with relatively little training;
(E) Whether the activities performed by the worker(s) are an integral part of the overall busi-
ness operation of the agricultural employer/association;
(F) Whether the work is performed on the agricultural employer/association's premises, rather
than on premises owned or controlled by another business entity; and
(G) Whether the agricultural employer/association undertakes responsibilities in relation to
the worker(s) which are commonly performed by employers, such as preparing and/or mak-
ing payroll records, preparing and/or issuing pay checks, paying FICA taxes, providing work-
ers' compensation insurance, providing field sanitation facilities, housing or transportation, or
providing tools and equipment or materials required for the job (taking into account the
amount of the investment).
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tionship among the parties. How the factors are weighed depends upon all of the
facts and circumstances.'4' This qualification by the DOL makes the factors dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to apply. 146 The real problem, however, is that regard-
less of whether a four-factor, 147 five-factor, 148 six-factor, 149 seven- factor,150 or
eight-factor.5 test is employed, the inquiry is complex, and the result is often
unpredictable. 152 Moreover, all of these tests, including the MWPA seven-factor
test, ultimately focus on control, leaving courts and counsel with, at best, a mod-
ified common-law test.
E. SUMMARY
As in the independent contractor/employee area, the determination of when a
company should be considered a joint employer together with one or more other
companies yields controversial and inconsistent results. This, too, is ripe for
restatement.
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. PROPOSAL TO REDEFINE CONTROL
Scholars have grappled with the definition of employee, and the increased im-
portance of contingent employment has intensified interest in the topic. Many
proposals for reform have urged the judiciary to adopt a more flexible definition
of control to reach more employment arrangements. 53 A typical example of this
145. Id. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv).
146. See generally John P. McAdams & Michael A. Shafir, Parent Company Liability Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 25 TRLA AD vC. Q. 16, 19-20 (2006) (examining FLSA liability when multiple
entities employ workers and lauding the DOL for promulgating guidance under the MWPA).
147. Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 10-15 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying four-factor test
to determine whether prison inmates who taught classes in a program managed by a community col-
lege were employees of the college for purposes of FLSA); Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency,
704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying four-factor test to determine whether an employment
relationship existed under FLSA).
148. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947) (considering question of employment in con-
text of Social Security Act).
149. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72 (applying six-factor test to determine whether garment workers were
jointly employed by manufacturer).
150. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (May 11, 2001), 2001 WL 1558966,
at *2 (applying seven-factor test to determine whether joint employment existed); see injra note 192
(setting forth those seven factors).
151. Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying eight-factor test in the
context of a joint employer inquiry).
152. Of course, if the factors all point in the same direction-a predictable case-the matter is
unlikely to be litigated.
153. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 5002 Corporate Self-Regulation
and the Low-Wage Workplace, 12 LEwis & CLAR L. Rv. 671, 690 (2008) (arguing that courts have
not properly interpreted the meaning of "suffer or permit"); Bruce Goldstein et al., Enjorcing Fair
Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition oj Employment,
46 UCLA L. Rv. 983, 989 (1999) (asserting that courts have not "operationalized" FLSA's definition
of "employ"); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Am-
biguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187,
207 (1999) (arguing that the judiciary has misinterpreted the FLSA's definition of "employ"); Benja-
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approach is set out in Professor Cunningham-Parmeter's recent article, From
Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy. 154 Professor
Cunningham-Parmeter considers the definition primarily in the context of the
FLSA. Noting that the FLSA includes a broad definition of "employ," Professor
Cunningham-Parmeter is highly critical of those courts that have defined the
term with reference to control, generally relying on the common-law definition
or variations thereof. In his view, however control is defined, the analysis de-
volves to a question of whether the putative employer exercises direct, daily
supervision of the worker or workers in question. He suggests, instead, that
the concept of control be expanded to include what he calls the subject of con-
trol, the direction of control, and the obligation of control. The subject of control
would require courts to focus on the extent to which the putative employer in-
fluences working conditions, not workers.155 The direction of control looks at
whether the worker, as a practical matter, has control over workplace decisions.
He articulates this concept in various ways, including "whether the worker is re-
ally 'in business for himself."'156 Finally, obligation of control refers to "a firm's
power over work relationships and any risk-creating conduct that gives rise to
[FLSA] violations."' 57 Taking these concepts of control together, he posits,
will enable courts to identify the party that "significantly influence[s] the circum-
stances of work."158
It is doubtful that Professor Cunningham-Parmeter's proposal would yield
consistent and predictable results. The ultimate goal of his inquiry-identifying
who determines working conditions-is unduly narrow. In considering the
question of who is an employee, more is at stake than working conditions.
The question, it seems, is more broadly the relationship between the employer
and the worker. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the additional tests
of control invite additional contracting and gamesmanship. Nevertheless, if con-
trol is the touchstone, then these additional inquiries into what control means
should prove helpful to the courts and other decision makers. This, of course,
begs the question: Should control be the test? This question is addressed in
Part V below.
min Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAws L. Rrv. 1511, 1515
(2016) (proposing overarching inquiry that focuses on the flexibility that workers have in determin-
ing the time, place, price, manner, and frequency of the work that they perform); Reif, supra note
127, at 359 (arguing that the judiciary has misinterpreted the FLSA's definition of "employ");
Brown, supra note 59, at 16 (recommending that courts focus on (1) whether the worker can improve
his economic opportunity through managerial skills, and (2) whether the worker's services are inte-
gral to the employer's business). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., COMMISSION
ON THE FUTUR WOR-R-MANcMiENr RE ITONS 21-22, 93-103 (1994) (containing policy recom-
mendations concerning contingent workforce); Symposium, The Regulatory Future oj Contingent Em-
ployment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. Rrv. 725 (1995) (collecting articles discussing legal and policy issues
affecting contingent workers).
154. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 10.
155. Id. at 1705-06.
156. Id. at 1708 (quoting Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008)).
157. Id. at 1712.
158. Id. at 1727.
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B. THE "INDEPENDENT WORKER" PROPOSAL
The "independent worker" proposal, suggested by Professors Seth Harris and
Alan Krueger, writing for the Brookings Institute,159 is not moored to control,
but it has its own shortcomings. Their proposal is premised on a new category
of workers, labeled "independent workers,-.6 who do not neatly fit within the
definition of employee or independent contractor. They focus primarily (but not
exclusively) on workers in the "gig economy,"161 such as drivers for Uber and
Lyft. Such workers are part of an arrangement in which their livelihood is at
least partially dependent upon an intermediary (such as an app provided by
Uber) that links the worker with the customer. In the offline world, such an in-
termediary may be a temporary employment agency that provides workers to its
client firms.
Professors Harris and Krueger argue that because current law provides the
courts with only a binary choice for characterizing such a worker-either as
an employee or independent contractor-inefficiencies are inevitable. For in-
stance, they argue, the intermediary (such as Uber) may eschew providing ben-
efits to the workers, thereby forgoing the efficiencies of pooling (such as risk
pooling for insurance), because doing so increases the risk that the relationship
between the workers and the intermediary will be judged to be an employment
relationship. 162 In addition, leaving such workers without the protections of fed-
eral law, such as the right to organize, minimum wage, and overtime laws, vio-
lates the "social compact," which Professors Harris and Krueger describe as "a
synthesis between the desire to enhance the efficiency of the operation of the
labor market (e.g., to overcome information asymmetries and imperfections)
and to ensure that the employment relationship treats workers fairly in light
of the unequal bargaining power that typifies most employee-employer elation-
ships. 163 Although one can quibble as to whether such a social compact exists,
their proposal seems to be grounded on their sense of fairness- it is unfair for a
large and growing segment of the labor force to be denied these rights and pro-
tections. 164 Consequently, their proposal describes which of such rights and
protections ought to be available to independent workers based on certain orga-
nizing principles that they identify.165 For instance, based on these principles,
independent workers would have the right to organize under federal labor
159. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal Jor Modernizing Labor Laws Jor Twenty-First-
Century Work: The "Independent Worker" (Brookings Inst., Discussion Paper No. 10, Dec. 2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing-labor laws for twenty first century_
work krueger harris.pdf.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 17.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. at 5 ("I]f an intermediary succeeds by displacing traditional employers who offer the
same service because the intermediary gains a cost advantage by avoiding provision of certain legally
mandated benefits and protections, then welfare is reduced by the innovation.").
165. Id. at 13-14 (setting forth three organizing principles to identify "independent workers": im-
measurability of work hours, neutrality, and efficiency).
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law, but they would not be entitled to overtime protection or unemployment
insurance. 166
This is a thoughtful proposal, and it has much to commend it. The proposal,
however, addresses only a slice of the new economy: enterprises that involve an
intermediary such as Uber. Left unaddressed are the independent contractor
problems evident in companies such as FedEx and the joint employer issue of
Browning-Ferris. More importantly, determining who falls within the definition
of an independent worker is itself a knotty problem. The authors describe inde-
pendent workers by, essentially, describing the Uber-driver-customer relation-
ship. 167 Variations in this relationship, whether by contract or operation,
would complicate the question of inclusion or exclusion. In addition, litigation
over the issue would now involve a three-part examination: Is the worker an em-
ployee, independent contractor, or independent worker? The authors propose
that Congress draft a statute providing certain protections to independent work-
ers, but writing that definition will prove difficult from a technical perspective
(and perhaps impossible from a political one).
V. NEW PROPOSALS TO CONSIDER
This part introduces two proposals, one geared toward the adjudicative pro-
cess and the other to legislation or rulemaking that courts, administrative agen-
cies, and legislators (as the case may be) might consider in resolving issues of
worker classification. The purpose of this part is not to provide comprehensive
guidelines but rather to introduce what might be more practical and sensible ap-
proaches, leaving more comprehensive guidelines for another day.
A. THE FAMILY RESEMBLANCE PROPOSAL: AN OPTION FOR COURTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
In thinking about how to classify workers in the absence of statutory defini-
tion, it is instructive to start with key paradigms. The paradigmatic independent
contractor is a person who has a business of providing specialized services to
multiple clients or customers. Think of an individual plumber or plumbing con-
tractor. The paradigmatic employee, by contrast, is a person who has no inde-
pendent business and works for one or a few employers. Think of a factory
166. Id. at 15-21. An alternative proposal would allow a "Jobseeker's Allowance-"a small, short-
term weekly allowance to support work search and preparation"-to workers who do not qualify for
traditional unemployment insurance. Rachel West et al., Strengthening Unemployment Protections in
America, CTR. AM. PRORS (June 16, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
poverty/report/2016/06/16/138492/strengthening-unemployment-protections-in-america/.
167. Harris & Krueger, supra note 159, at 9 ("Independent workers operate in a triangular rela-
tionship: they provide services to customers identified with the help of intermediaries. The interme-
diaries create a communications channel, typically an 'app,' that customers use to identify themselves
as needing a service-for example, a car ride, landscaping services, or food delivery .... The inter-
mediaries' apps allow independent workers to select which customers they would like to serve. The
intermediary does not assign the customer to the independent worker; rather, the independent
worker chooses or declines to serve the customer (sometimes within broadly defined limits).").
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worker on a production line. Basically, as a matter of common law, courts
reverse-engineered criteria that describe these two contrasting workers. Many
businesses, like FedEx and Uber, responded to that common law by structuring
their relationship with their workers to fit the criteria of one definition (typically
that of independent contractor). A better approach may be to use a "family resem-
blance" test: that is, consider the reality of the operations of the business in question
and ask whether the worker involved bears a closer resemblance to our paradig-
matic plumber/independent contractor or to the factory worker/employee.
The U.S. Supreme Court employed that analysis in an entirely different con-
text to resolve a similar problem. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 168 the legal issue was
whether the promissory note issued by an agricultural cooperative was a "secur-
ity" within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") and
therefore subject to its provisions. 169 The Court first observed that, based on
what it perceived to be Congress's intent, not all promissory notes are subject
to the provisions of the 1934 Act. 170 Rather, Congress intended to cover only
those notes that were investments, as opposed to notes issued in a commercial
or consumer context. 17 1 Given the broad language of the statute, however, the
Court recognized a presumption that a promissory note is an investment and
therefore a security. 172 This presumption may be overcome if a litigant estab-
lishes that the note in question was commonly recognized as a commercial or
consumer note, or it had more characteristics in common with a note issued
in a commercial or consumer context than one issued in an investment con-
text. 173 The Court then described the characteristics of the two kinds of
notes. 174 Finally, the Court considered the characteristics of the note then before
it and compared those characteristics to the two paradigms. 175 It held that the
note at issue bore a greater resemblance to an investment note than to a con-
sumer note, and, therefore, it fell under the terms of the 1934 Act. 76
The Reves opinion cited with approval the approach of the Second Circuit,
which had generated an actual list of notes that would not be considered secu-
rities because they arose in a commercial or consumer context. In examining the
Second Circuit's enumerated list, the Supreme Court identified four characteris-
tics that are relevant to determining whether a note falls within the definition. 177
This same approach may be helpful to courts and administrative agencies faced
168. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
169. 15 U.5.C. § 78c(0) (2012) (defining "security" to mean, among other things, "any note,"
"unless the context otherwise r quires"). The plaintiffs sought the anti-fraud protections afforded
by the 1934 Act. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 59.
170. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
171. Id. at 62.
172. Id. at 65.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 66-67.
175. Id. at 67-70.
176. Id. at 70.
177. Id. at 66-67 (identifying the following four factors: the motivations of the buyer and seller,
the plan of distribution, the reasonable expectations of the investing public, and whether another eg-
ulatory scheme reduces the risk of the instrument).
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with the determination of whether a worker is an employee or independent con-
tractor, especially if combined with a presumption. Given that employment laws
are intended to protect workers, it makes sense to create a presumption, as the
California courts have done, 178 that a worker who "performs services" for the
benefit of the purported employer is an employee of that employer. An employer
could overcome this presumption by proving that its relationship with this
worker bore a strong resemblance to a recognized principal/independent con-
tractor relationship. The challenge under this approach, then, is to identify ex-
amples of independent contractors and the factors that typify them.
Knowledgeable observers would likely agree that paradigmatic independent
contractors have their own businesses and are engaged by customers or clients
to achieve a particular, agreed-upon outcome. The Restatement of Employment
Law captures this idea by moving away from the concept of control solely as
it relates to the way agents perform their services to asking whether they have
"entrepreneurial control over business decisions. 179 Workers with entrepre-
neurial control "can seek to increase their personal economic returns not simply
by working harder in performing the service for the principal but also by work-
ing at their discretion for other customers, by hiring assistants and by deploying
or substituting for labor their own equipment or capital."1s ° Control as a factor,
it should be remembered, arose in the context of respondeat superior, and it
ought not to be an issue-or at least should be much less of an issue-when
the question is coverage under employment and labor statutes. It may turn
out that, under the approach suggested here, workers are deemed employees
under an employment law statute, but their employer is not vicariously liable
for the workers' tortious conduct because their employer lacked "control
[over] the manner and means" of the performance of their work.1s 1 That out-
come seems preferable to the prevailing view, however, which requires that con-
trol exist for statutory as well as common-law purposes before a worker is con-
sidered an employee, unless the operative statute provides otherwise.
Under this proposal, the FedEx and Uber cases, for instance, arguably would
have been more easily resolved. Typical FedEx drivers did not have their own
business delivering packages before being hired by FedEx.182 The FedEx Oper-
ating Agreement was fashioned to create an independent business for the drivers,
178. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
179. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAw INST. 2015).
180. Id.; see also Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting
that the critical difference between employees and independent contractors is "the degree to which
each functions as an entrepreneur-that is, takes economic risk and has the corresponding opportu-
nity to profit from working smarter, not just harder"). The Restatement comment, however, continues
with a strong reference to the importance of control: "Service providers who are subject to employer
control of their performance that effectively prevents them from providing services as independent
businesspersons are employees, regardless of the manner of their compensation or the flexibility of
their work hours." RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. e.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) O AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
182. It is possible that a driver did have such a business, but, if so, he or she likely sold it before
going to work for FedEx. It is hard to imagine that many, if any, drivers were operating such a busi-
ness before or while working for FedEx.
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and the courts should have distinguished workers who had independent busi-
nesses before contracting with a purported employer from those who did not.
Uber is a more difficult case because some drivers also might drive or have
driven for Lyft or other similar companies. But as with FedEx, the drivers for
Uber did not have an independent business in which they were engaged by cus-
tomers or clients to achieve a particular, agreed-upon outcome. The fact that
some Uber drivers might have driven for Lyft or a similar company, or may
do so in the future, does not necessarily mean that they had an independent
business before becoming Uber drivers. Independent businesses promote them-
selves to potential customers and typically stand ready to provide their services
to multiple customers. The typical Uber driver, according to Uber's promotional
materials, is not a professional driver- rather, he or she may be a student or a
worker in another field entirely. Again, the focus on control misses the point
of the relationship between the worker and purported employer.
A more challenging case, and one that typifies many situations,"' is presented
by the facts in NLRB v. Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. 114 Dial-A-Mattress in-
volved a business model similar to FedEx: drivers, with their own trucks (called
owner-operators in the opinion), delivered merchandise for Dial-A-Mattress Oper-
ating Corp. ("Dial"). The twist in this case was that many of the owner-operators
owned multiple trucks and employed several drivers, and, unlike FedEx, the Dial
owner-operators had greater freedom to reject deliveries, did not have to mark
their vehicles with any company logo, and could use their vehicles to deliver for
other customers (although not for competitors of Dial). On the basis of these
facts, the NLRB ruled that the owner-operators were independent contractors.
The NLRB was heavily influenced by the lack of control exercised or exercisable
by Dial:
* The owner-operators arranged their own training, hired their own em-
ployees, and had sole control over and complete responsibility for their
employees, including setting their terms and conditions of employment.
* Dial also played no part in the selection, acquisition, ownership, financing,
inspection, or maintenance of the vehicles used by the owner-operators.
* There was no minimum compensation guaranteed the owner-operators
to minimize their risk of performing deliveries for Dial, and they could
decline orders without penalty.
* The owner-operators were not required to provide delivery services each
scheduled workday.
183. Short-haul truck drivers, who service the nation's largest ports, are currently challenging
their status as independent contractors. The drivers move containers from large ships to nearby
rail yards and distribution centers and are similar to the drivers in Dial-A- Mattress. See, e.g., Erica
E. Phillips, Contract Drivers Take Battle to Ports, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2016, at B1; Kirk Siegler &
Byron Contrerras, Truckers Strike at Two Caljornia Ports, Larger Labor Dispute Looms, NAIL PUB.
RADIO (July 8, 2014), 2014 WLNR 18508882.
184. 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998).
Agency Law and the New Economy 1041
In short, their separateness from Dial was manifested in many ways, in-
cluding significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss. 185
The Board was not unanimous in its conclusion- its chairman dissented, argu-
ing that the majority was overly influenced by the form of the arrangement be-
tween Dial and its owner-operators and that it underappreciated the substance of
the arrangement."16 The Board could have paid greater attention to whether any
particular owner-operator had a separate delivery business that predated its con-
tract with Dial and, therefore, fit within the paradigm of an independent contrac-
tor. Based on the facts of Dial -A -Mattress, it appears that some of the drivers did
have businesses that extended beyond Dial, but most did not. It would be sen-
sible to differentiate among the owner- operators, finding at least some as em-
ployees and others as independent contractors, even though the control element
was similar for all. With regard to owner-operators who hired others to drive
their vehicles, those drivers would appear to be employees of both Dial and
the owner-operator.
The joint employer issue similarly suffers from overemphasis on the control
factor. Businesses ought not to be able to shirk or avoid the responsibilities of
employment and labor law by having their workers report to an intermediary.
The contract between a client firm and intermediaries, as in Browning-Ferris
and Dial -A -Mattress, are structured so that the intermediary is an independent
contractor vis-a-vis the client firm. It is fair to ask whether the services furnished
by the intermediary firm are typically provided by an independent contractor
and whether the intermediary is in the business to which the contract relates.
Many intermediary firms are in the business of supplying labor for a client
firm and not organized to operate in a particular business. In Browning-Ferris,
for example, the intermediary, Leadpoint, was not generally in the recycling
business. In that regard, Leadpoint was like Uber drivers in that Leadpoint's
contract with BFI created Leadpoint's independent recycling business. The
Browning-Ferris case focused heavily on the relationship between BFI and the
Leadpoint workers to determine whether BFI had sufficient control over those
workers to be deemed their employer. That proved to be a difficult test to
meet. The NLRB could have taken a different approach and focused more on
the relationship between BFI and Leadpoint: was Leadpoint in the business of
furnishing waste disposal companies ("BFI") with recycling services, or was Lead-
point's recycling "business" created by its contract with BFI? It seems that the
latter was the case,187 and, if the proposed inquiry had been used, the NLRB
185. Id. at 884-89.
186. Id. at 894 (Gould, Ch., dissenting).
187. On its website, Leadpoint describes its business as follows:
Leadpoint provides high performance work teams, on demand. Our Workjorce Optimization Pro-
cess streamlines the hiring, on-boarding, employee and management training, labor develop-
ment, and performance measurement resulting in sustained productivity gains. Founded in
1994, Leadpoint has thousands of employees working at our customer partners in operations
across the country. Leadpoint is also a Woman Owned Business and certified Minority Business
Enterprise (MBE).
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could have more easily found BFI to be the employer, together with Leadpoint, of
the employees in question. Similarly, most of the owner-operators in Dial-A-
Mattress were in the business of supplying trucks and drivers to Dial and not oth-
erwise in the trucking business.
The efficacy of the family resemblance test in this context is made manifest by
the DOL's effort to describe the factors relevant to determining whether farm
workers are employees of more than one entity. Although the DOL identified
seven factors relevant to the determination, in the end, its guidance is of limited
use because it cautioned that those seven factors were "not... exhaustive" and
because the DOL failed to indicate how the factors are to be weighed."18 Simi-
larly, in the context of an FLSA case, the Second Circuit reversed a lower court
decision that had applied a four-factor test from a previous Second Circuit opin-
ion.189 In reversing the lower court's decision that the worker in question was
not an employee, the appellate court said that it had never held that "a positive
finding on those four factors is necessary to establish an employment relation-
ship."'1g The appellate court then identified a six-factor test that would be "per-
tinent" to identifying the "economic realities" of the employment relationship in
the "circumstances" of that case.191 The DOL, in an opinion letter interpreting
the FLSA, identified seven factors "relevant" to determining whether a joint em-
ployment situation exists.192 An approach that cuts through these multifactor
tests may yield more consistent, predictable results. That is at least worth a try.
B. THE STATUTORY PROPOSAL
A second proposal involves consideration of the classification of workers in
context. Regarding any law that involves the employer/employee relationship,
one should be aware of the goals that the legislators sought to accomplish.
For instance, the federal minimum wage law is intended to protect workers
from exploitation by setting a floor, albeit a somewhat arbitrary floor, on the
worker's compensation. If a person drives for Uber, is there any reason not to
apply that minimum? Isn't the risk of exploitation the same for such workers?
LEADPOINT, http://leadpointusa.con! (last visited June 24, 2017). According to its website, Leadpoint
serves the following industries- "Waste and Recyling, Manufacturing, tand] Logistics and Warehous-
ing." Id. (setting forth industries via drop-down menu under heading "Industries Served").
188. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv) (2016).
189. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating district court's erroneous
reliance on Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984)).
190. Id. at 69.
191. Id. at 72; see Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)
(discussing Zheng).
192. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (May 11, 2001), 2001 WL
1558966, at *2 (identifying relevant factors to include (1) power to control or supervise workers
or work performed; (2) power, whether alone or jointly, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify
employment conditions of individual; (3) permanency and uration of relationship; (4) level of skill
involved; (5) whether worker's activities are integral part of overall business operations; (6) where
work is performed and whose equipment is used; and (7) who performs payroll and similar func-
tions). The question, however, is whether joint employment exists from the "totality of the evidence."
Barfield, 537 F.3d at 149.
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Consider instead the rule relating to the allocation of vicarious liability to an em-
ployer. Although the intent of this rule is a bit elusive, it encourages employers to
exercise control over their employees to minimize the harm that employees
might cause to others in performing their jobs and to provide a source of com-
pensation for persons injured by the employees of others. 193 Uber requires in-
surance of its drivers (as does state law), and Uber is not in a position to super-
vise their driving. It therefore makes little sense to impose vicarious liability on
Uber for its drivers' negligent driving.
Rather than focus on control (or an enhanced control inquiry, as Professor
Cunningham-Parmeter suggests), a better approach-one that could be specifi-
cally addressed by statute or rule-would have legislators or administrators
focus on whether the statute or rule should apply to a worker who functions
as an employee of the covered business, that is, a person who renders services
that are part of the firm's regular business. To further ensure that true indepen-
dent contractors are not captured under the mandate, the law might include
some sort of numerical test when the workplace includes workers formally em-
ployed by an intermediary. That is, the statute might cover workers if such ser-
vices are rendered for at least a certain number of hours per day, over a certain
period of time, and if at least a certain number of individuals are compensated by
the intermediary in a similar way. So, for instance, a minimum wage law might
cover any worker who provides services for the employer (whether paid directly
by the employer or paid by an intermediary) when there are at least a certain
number of similarly situated individuals providing the same or similar services
for the same employer for an extended period of time. This would, of course,
be in addition to any workers who are classified by the employer as employees.
This sort of formulation skirts the question of whether the employer exercises
control.
The key to this analysis is a return to the paradigms. Suppose a yoga studio
has a plumbing problem and contacts an unaffiliated firm to correct the problem.
Suppose further that the yoga studio already employs an aggregate of thirty
teachers and office personnel. Would the yoga studio be an employer of the
plumber, assuming that it clearly would not be under the common-law defini-
tion? In other words, would this approach radically change the common law?
The answer is no. The plumber is not rendering services that are part of the
yoga studio's business. The yoga studio is in the business of teaching yoga clas-
ses, not providing plumbing services, so neither the plumber nor any of the
plumber's employees would be considered employees of the yoga studio. 194
193. See J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC: THE Law oF
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRSES 155-56 (9th ed. 2015) (summarizing rationales for the doctrine
of respondeat superior, with citations to various authorities).
194. If the yoga studio regularly employed a plumber-because, for instance, the studio also had a
spa and other facilities that justified retaining a fulltime plumber-that plumber would be considered
an employee of the yoga studio under this analysis. The plumber junctions as an employee of the Stu-
dio, supporting facilities that are part of the studio's regular business. Moreover, the plumber doesn't
satisfy the criteria for an independent contractor because he or she is not engaged in a distinct
business.
1044 The Business Lawyer, Vol. 72, Fall 2017
This follows from the emphasis of different common-law factors-whether the
one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business and whether the
work is part of the regular business of the employer-and a de-emphasis on
the control factor-the extent of control the employer exercises over the details
of the work.
How would this approach apply to Uber? After all, Uber claims that its drivers
are not rendering services for Uber but rather are working for themselves. Not-
withstanding its claims, Uber is in the business of at least arranging or facilitating
transportation services, and the drivers are directly furthering Uber's business-
transportation services are part of the regular business of Uber.
Some have expressed concern that treating Uber drivers as employees and not
independent contractors will have a dampening effect on technological innova-
tion. 95 Nonetheless, policy decisions regarding wages and other aspects of em-
ployment protection ought not to be displaced just to encourage innovation.
Rather, employment policies are the playing field on which technology must
compete, and the playing field ought not to be altered to accommodate or en-
courage certain technologies. More fundamentally, if employment laws create
economic inefficiencies-if, for instance, the costs, in the aggregate, to employers
of compliance with the Family and Medical Leave Act 196 exceed the societal
benefits-then changes to the law ought to be considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although not widely recognized, a person who works for another may be clas-
sified as an employee for some purposes and as an independent contractor for
other purposes. This can easily happen if the worker, while operating under a
formal independent contractor agreement, injures a third party. That injured
person may persuade a fact-finder that the degree of control exercised by the pu-
tative employer over the worker satisfied the common law employer/employee
test, even though the worker is not an employee under, for example, certain
tax laws.
This article argues that statutory law should unmoor itself from the common-
law definition, which, as noted above, developed in the context of vicarious li-
ability, not in the context of worker or consumer protection. Ideally, legislators
adopting employment-related laws would specify, by definition, who is intended
to be covered by such legislation. With statutory definitions, a worker may be
deemed an employee for some purposes but not others, and this result makes
perfect sense, as different interests are at stake. 197 For extant legislation lacking
195. E.g., Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Econ-
omy, 16 MINN. J.L. Sc & TECH. 413, 462-65 (2015).
196. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
197. See Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case jor Amending
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. Rv. 239, 240
(1997) ("The question of whether independent contractors should fall within the aegis of statutes de-
signed to protect workers does not yield a single, blanket analysis and answer. After all, the purposes
and operations of, for example, the Fair Labor Standards Act (TLSA') differ from those of the Occu-
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such specificity, this article suggests a test-the "family resemblance test"-that
might substitute for (and, hopefully, improve upon) the common-law control
test that has dominated the employee classification question. In the family re-
semblance test that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted to determine whether a
promissory note should be classified as a security, the Court compared the char-
acteristics of the promissory note at issue with notes that clearly are securities
(i.e., investment notes) and notes that clearly are not securities (i.e., commercial
or consumer notes). For worker classification cases, a similar analysis might be
used, with the fact-finder's comparing the worker in question to a paradigmatic
employee and paradigmatic independent contractor. This article suggests that
this approach is a worthy challenger for the multifactor, control-centric tests re-
flected in judicial precedents and one that can reshape the common-law defini-
tion of "employee."
Properly classifying workers as employees or independent contractors has
been a challenge for both state and federal courts, and the resulting decisions
are not always consistent with one another or with the underlying intent of
the law in question. Many commentators have suggested tweaks to the judicially
created tests, but this article recommends a somewhat more radical approach for
both legislators and judges to consider.
pational Safety and Health Act ('OSHA'). As discussed below, the task of defining 'employee' should
be conducted separately for different types of employment-related statutes, particularly when statutes
such as FLSA affect labor market competition much more directly than statutes such as OSHA.").

